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Mary Ellen O’Connell

Abstract

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the looting of the Iraqi National Museum in April 2003 by remarking, “stuff happens.” In doing so, he gave
an early indication that in planning to invade Iraq, the Bush Administration failed
to take seriously the legal obligations of an occupying power. Occupying powers
have a variety of binding legal obligations, including obligations to stop looting,
protect cultural property, and protect persons in detention. Yet, the Administration
sent a wholly inadequate force to fulfill those obligations, and, more seriously, the
force received no direct and imperative orders to do so. As a result, in addition to
the questionable basis for initiating war the war in the first place, the Administration conducted it in a way that amounts to an independent ground for concluding
the decision to invade Iraq on March 19, 2003, violated international law.
This article focuses on the Administration’s failure to protect Iraqi cultural property as one clear example of the Administration’s disregard for its obligations.
The article discusses cultural property and the long, continuous development of
legal principles, through treaties and rules of customary international law for the
protection of cultural property in wartime—developments in which the United
States has played a leading role. On the eve of the Iraq invasion, no US leader
could have been in doubt about the legal requirements to stop looting and protect cultural property. Yet, we find little evidence of any preparation to do so.
The article analyzes the literature on Iraqi war planning to understand why this
lapse occurred. It further analyzes the consequences of this failures, including:
the possibility that individuals will be held accountable; the high cost to the US
associated with the war, and Iraq’s right to claim reparations, including in-kind
reparations from US holdings of Iraqi cultural property.
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Occupation Failures and the Legality of Armed Conflict:
The Case of Iraqi Cultural Property
Mary Ellen O’Connell1

“…[I]t’s the same picture of some person walking out of
some building with a vase, and you see it 20 times and you
think, ‘My goodness, were there that many vases? Is it
possible there were that many vases in the whole
country?’”
Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense,
April 11, 20032

The US State Department estimates that 13,400 objects were looted during
April 2003 from the Iraqi National Museum alone.3

To wage war consistently with international law, a national leader must be able to answer
at least three questions in the affirmative: Is there a right to resort to force? Is the use of
force necessary? If it is necessary, can it be carried out in a way that the cost in terms of
William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law and Fellow of the Mershon Center, The Ohio State
University. With thanks for research assistance to Sara DePaul, J.D. This paper was presented as a work in
progress to the Islamic Art Circle at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, May
19, 2004. I am grateful to Professor Doris Abouseif-Behrens, the organizer, and to the audience for helpful
questions and comments. The paper was also presented at a Faculty Workshop at the Moritz College of
Law of The Ohio State University, March 31, 2004. Professor Marc Spindelman organized the Workshop
and he and the other participants, again asked helpful questions and made useful comments, for which I am
grateful.
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Order Must Be Restored, TORONTO STAR, April 12, 2003, 2003 WL 18626289.
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human lives, property, and damage to the natural environment will not outweigh the
value of resorting force? If the answer to any of these questions is no, the use of force is
unlawful. International lawyers tend to focus on the first question, understandably. Why
analyze necessity and proportionality standards if the president or prime minister has no
legal right to go to war in the first place? And when there is a right, the analysis of
necessity and proportionality typically shifts from the strategic to the tactical level. As a
result, there is a tendency to overlook the second and third equally important questions in
the decision for war.
This paper takes up the third question in assessing the Bush Administration’s decision to
use force against Iraq. Applying a conservative analysis of the formal sources of
international law—treaties and customary rules clearly binding on the United States—we
reach the conclusion that the manner in which the Bush Administration decided to carry
out the use of force in Iraq rendered the decision unlawful, independently of the answers
to questions one and two. The decision to invade “on the cheap” violated America’s
international law obligations on the conduct of war.4 Lawfully invading and occupying
Iraq required a commitment to protecting civilians and their property during fighting and
in the subsequent occupation. Human Rights Watch has made a strong case that the
Administration failed to take adequate precautions to protect civilian lives.5 The
evidence is overwhelming that the rights of persons in US military custody were
violated.6 Among the violations are numerous cases of individuals held in detention
indefinitely simply because there were not sufficient US personnel to process detainees.
This paper looks at the failure of US forces to protect the Iraqi people’s extraordinary
cultural heritage, both during the invasion and during the occupation of Iraq.
The paper begins by discussing cultural heritage in light of legal requirements to protect
certain objects even at the cost of resources, military advantage and risk to lives. The
paper then considers the rules that have grown up over time to protect cultural heritage in
war and links the requirement of protection to the ab initio decision to go to war. In
addition to various treaties on the law of armed conflict, the customary law principles of
necessity and proportionality mandate the protection of cultural property even in the
waging of a righteous and necessary conflict. The final part of the paper looks at the USled invasion of Iraq, the failure to plan for protection, and the consequences of that
failure. One foreseeable consequence is the likelihood of future Iraqi claims to
reparations, including in-kind reparations of cultural property held in coalition countries.
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Regarding the legality of invading Iraq, see infra, notes __ - __ and accompanying text.
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I.

Cultural Heritage and Cultural Property

Cultural heritage is what a society continues to possess from its past that relates to its
culture. Cultural heritage can take the form of literature, dance, music, art, handcrafts,
buildings and structures of archeological significance, and other such tangibles and
intangibles. Here we will focus on cultural property, a smaller category within the larger
cultural heritage concept. “Cultural ‘property’ is ‘that specific form of property that
enhances identity, understanding, and appreciation for the culture that produced the
particular property.”7 The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict defines cultural property in Article 1:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “cultural property”
shall cover, irrespective of origin or ownership:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history,
whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings
which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art;
manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or
archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property
defined above;”8
According to Merryman, the idea of cultural property in the 1954 Convention
“culminates a development in the international law of war that began in the mid-19th
century.”9

7

Lucille A. Roussin, Cultural Heritage and Identity, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 707 (2003), quoting
Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the United
States, 75 B. U. L. REV. 559, 569 (1995); citing also Randall Mason, Conference Reports: Economics and
Heritage Conservation: Concepts, Values, and Agendas for Research, Getty Conservation Institute, Los
Angeles (Dec. 8-11, 1998), 8 INT’L J. OF CUL. PTY. 550, 561 (1999); Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe,
“Cultural Property” or “Cultural Heritage,” 1 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL. PROP. 307 (1998); Frank G.
Fechner, The Fundamental Aims of Cultural Property Law, 7 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL. PROP. 376, 378-80
(1998).
8

Article 1 continues:
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural
property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of
archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural
property defined in subparagraph (a); (c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as
defined in subparagraphs (a) and (b), to be known as “centers containing monuments.”

1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict, 249 UNTS
240, art. 4(3)[hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]. (
9
John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 831 (1986).
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The US and UK are signatories only to this convention. As signatories they have at least
an obligation not to defeat the objects and purposes of the treaty pending its coming into
force.10 The United States has not ruled out ratifying the 1954 Convention, so the
Convention is still “pending its coming into force.” In 1994, the top lawyers at the
United States Departments of State and Defense reviewed the Convention and supported
its submission to the Senate for ratification. It was not submitted at that time, however,
apparently owing to a shortage of experts to prepare the submission.11 In addition, much
of the 1954 Convention is binding as customary international law, especially basic
provisions that build on prior law and have been reinforced by subsequent treaties, such
as article 1.12
The Hague Convention places cultural property in a category of special legal protection
in time of war.13 The preamble states that “damage to cultural property belonging to any
people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each
people makes its contribution to the culture of the world” and “the preservation of
cultural heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the world….”14 The 1970
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property adds that “cultural property
constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization and national culture” and that “it is
essential for every State to become increasingly alive to the moral obligations to respect
its own cultural heritage and that of all nations.”15
Cultural property is of such importance to people and their countries
because it helps to explain and represent their past. In other words, we can
learn about history by examining and studying cultural property, but in
addition as a people we can form an identity from the accomplishments
that have occurred in the past, and exist today in the form of cultural
objects. Accordingly, ‘the material objects through which the highest
achievements of the human spirit are embodied must therefore be

10

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 8, 1155 UNTS 331.
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See, Hays Parks, Protection of Cultural Property From the Effects of War, in THE LAW OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY AND NATURAL HERITAGE: PROTECTION, TRANSFER AND ACCESS, 3-24 (Marilyn Phelan et al.
eds., 1998).
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See David A. Meyer, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Its Emergence into Customary
International Law, 11 B.U. Int’l L.J. 349, 387-89 (1993). See also, Jan Hladik, The 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the Notion of
Military Necessity, 81 RICR/IRRC 621 (1999).
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Merryman, supra note, at 841.
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1954 Hague Convention, supra note, preamble.
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Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232, preamble[hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention].
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treasured, as well as those objects that simply help to define who we are
and how we live as a people.16
In this age of globalization, the protection of cultural heritage becomes even more
significant. Cultural property, as part of each peoples’ “contribution to the culture of the
world,” stands as a link to the very roots of civilization. The next section goes into detail
about the laws protecting cultural property in the event of armed conflict.
II.

Protection of Cultural Property in War

Through the ages, humanity has sought to limit both the resort to war and the conduct
permitted in war. Both endeavors protect cultural property. By limiting resort to war, the
damage and destruction to cultural property caused by war is also coincidentally limited.
The restrictions on conduct in war have typically included protection of cultural property.
These twin efforts to control war are traditionally divided into two sets of legal rules: the
jus (or ius) ad bellum governing the decision to go to war and the jus (or ius) in bello
governing how a war is to be waged. The jus in bello applies equally to all sides in a
conflict, regardless of a party’s violation of the ad bellum rules.17 The in bello rules take
account of military necessity; respecting them should not give an advantage to one side or
the other in a conflict. Moreover, all sides to a conflict typically claim they are acting
lawfully. What state would ever agree that it was bound by the rules of the aggressor?
Thus, international law needs only one set of in bello rules.
Despite their equal application regardless of the ad bellum violation, the in bello rules are
intrinsically linked to the ad bellum rules. A state deciding for war must be willing to
respect the jus in bello. Refusing to do so can render an otherwise lawful resort to armed
force unlawful.18 In this section, we trace the broad outlines of how the jus in bello with
respect to cultural property and the general jus ad bellum have evolved from earliest
times until the day the US-led coalition decided for war against Iraq in 2003.
Both categories of law have ancient pedigrees and both have continued to grow and
develop despite constant challenges. In the 5th Century, St. Augustine introduced the Just
War Doctrine that not only restricted when force should be used, but also how.
16
Sarah Eagen, Preserving Cultural Property: Our Public Duty: A Look at How and Why We Must Create
International Laws that Support International Action, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 407, 411-412 (2001), quoting
LYNDEL V. PROTT & P. J.O’KEEFE, LAW AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 8 (1984).
17

For a discussion of this point, see, Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between the Ius Ad Bellum
and Ius In Bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221, 225-30 (1983).
18

Id. at 222-24. See also, the literature on the law of armed conflict, more widely known as “humanitarian
law,” in particular: YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT (2004); The HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT (Dieter Fleck ed.,
1995)[hereinafter THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW]; L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT (2000); ASSISTING THE VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER DISASTERS (Frits
Kalshoven ed., 1989); FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR (1987); GEOFFREY
BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980).
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Augustine drew principally on Christian teaching that combines the Old and New
Testaments, but he was also heavily influenced by Greek and Roman principles. The
Greeks and Romans promoted mercy in wartime especially towards defenseless persons,
including enemy prisoners.19 Both ancient communities had principles for the protection
of cultural property.20 Augustine counseled fighting war always with an eye on winning
the peace. Even wars fought against evil men to stop them from committing further evil
had to be done in a way that did not reduce the enemy to an outlaw. If the overriding
justification of any war was to create lasting peace, the conduct of war had to be carried
out in a way that would allow for future trust.21
The Church in the Middle Ages perpetuated Augustine’s ideas on both the resort to war
and the conduct of war.22 In addition, unwritten codes—codes of chivalry—also carried
forward to modern international law principles on the conduct of war.23 Hugo Grotius,
the reputed father of international law, devoted considerable space in his 17th century The
Law of War and Peace to the proper conduct of armed conflict. He wrote in detail on the
use of reprisals, the treatment of property, treatment of the sick and wounded, burial
rights, and much more. Among the most important principles, he includes the basic
requirement that the waging of war is not unlimited: Grotius had seen the violation of
these principles and more in the brutal Thirty Years’ War. One of the most infamous acts
of the war was the plundering of the Palatine Library in Heidelberg.24 When the war
ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 “the nature of relations between fighting men
had changed.”25 The system of chivalry faded out as professional officer corps replaced
19

GREEN, supra note, at 21-22; THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 4-5 (Leon Friedman ed.,
1972).
20

THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note, at 4; Joshua Kastenberg, The Legal Regime
for Protecting Cultural Property During Armed Conflict, 42 AIR FOR. L. REV. 277, 281-81 (1997).

21

WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-08 (trans.& rev’d, Michael Byers 2000).

22

GREEN, supra note, at 24.

23

GREEN supra note, at 24-25; Geoffrey Parker, Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR:
CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD, 40, 42 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994).

24

JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 1-2 (4th ed. 2003),
quoting, Charles De Visscher, International Protection of Works of Art and Historic Monuments, US
Department of State, Documents & State Papers, 821, 823 (June 1949).

25

GREEN, supra note, at 28.

http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art6

knights in the new military organizations of sovereign states.26 Lawful war became “a
hostile contention by means of armed forces carried on between states.”27 This change
opened new possibilities for the imposition ofin bello obligations; though the rise of the
sovereign state was undermining the ad bellum rules based on natural law principles.
Grotius’ successor as the most influential international law scholar of his time, Emmerich
de Vattel (1714-1767), helped foster the concept of absolute sovereignty in the emerging
state system. Vattel thought in terms of what would best serve his employers, various
princes and rulers of small states in Central Europe. He believed they wanted strong
principles of non-intervention and equality. He insisted on express consent as necessary
to bind a state. He did not believe a ruler could be judged by other rulers on his decision
to go to war. In the conduct of war, too, Vattel considered what would strengthen the
position of a ruler over the long term. He recounts how the Duke of Alva’s decision to
execute 20,000 citizens of The Netherlands resulted in a backlash that Spain could not
contain, eventually costing it the territory. Vattel, therefore, recommended that in the
conduct of war respect be shown for the principles of humanity, forbearance, truthfulness
and honor.28 Complying with the law of war would diminish the interest in retaliation
and foster trust, which is needed to eventually reach an agreement on peace. With
respect to property, here is just one relevant excerpt from Vattel’s writing:
For whatever cause a country be devastated, those buildings should be
spared which are an honor to the human race and which do not add to the
strength of the enemy, such as temples, tombs, public buildings, and all
edifices of remarkable beauty. What is gained by destroying them? It is
the act of a declared enemy of the human race thus wantonly to deprive
men of these monuments of art and models of architecture….We still
abhor the acts of those barbarians who, in overrunning the Roman Empire,
destroyed so many wonders of art….29
Vattel’s influence reached the Americas where Benjamin Franklin and other Founding
Fathers were his avid readers.30 In 1785, Franklin concluded with Frederick the Great of
26

Robert C. Stacy, The Age of Chivalry, in THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note, at 27, 39.

27

GREEN, supra note, at 28-29.

28

VATTEL, supra note, at 338.

29

VATTEL, supra note, at 293-295.

30

ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 161 (rev’d ed.,1962).
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Prussia a treaty of friendship and commerce that also codified principles for the conduct
of conflict. The treaty is credited with being one of the first international agreements to
contain humanitarian law principles in written form.31 Vattel’s teaching on the law in
bellowas plainly ignored, however, by revolutionary France. According to De Visscher,
the 18th century was relatively free of plundering, then,
…however, the lust for spoliation revived once again, bursting forth with
unprecedented violence.
The wars of the Revolution, the Consulate, and the Empire show that
France, with her well-known ruthlessness, plundered palaces, museums,
and churches in the provinces conquered by her armies…Just as Rome
once did, Paris was destined to enrich herself with the artistic treasures of
conquered peoples; those treasures were regarded as trophies of victory
and the adornments of a nation that, by initiating the love of freedom in
Europe, deserved to become the center of sciences and arts.32
In the negotiations of 1815 that ended the Napoleonic wars, delegates made demands that
France return looted objects.33 These demands began the development of an international
legal prohibition on pillage of cultural property as well as the remedy of return.
With advances in technology, civilians and soldiers alike began suffering the effects of
war in ways that led to demands for safeguards. The United States Civil War was
particularly brutal and induced President Lincoln to approve the drafting of “General
Orders No. 100” by Francis Lieber, a German-American professor of international law at
Columbia College, now Columbia University. The result was a detailed manual for
Union forces to guide their conduct in the war. “Lieber’s Code was the first attempt to
set down, in a single set of instructions for forces in the field, the laws and customs of
war.”34 Lieber had himself fought in Europe before immigrating to the United States. He
lost one son fighting for the Confederacy and had two other sons who fought for the

31

THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note, at 17.

32

De Visscher, supra note.

33

MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note, at 5-8.

34

THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note, 18.
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Union.35 He was uniquely qualified to produce a manual that rapidly won wide
acceptance. By the end of the 19th century, the leading western military powers adopted
either Lieber’s Code directly or adapted it for their own militaries. According to Hays
Parks, “While well-deserved credit is given the Swiss humanitarian Jean Henri Dunant
for establishment of the modern law of war, the codification of the law of war as to
protection of cultural property rests more with Dr. Francis Lieber….”36
Among the important provisions on the protection of cultural property in the Lieber Code
are:
Art. 35. Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious
instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, as well as hospitals, must be
secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in
fortified places which are besieged or bombarded.
Art. 44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded
country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized
officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking…are prohibited….
Art. 45. All captures and booty belong…primarily to the government of
the captor.37

35

RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE OF THE LAW OF WAR, 5-7, 15 (1983).

36

Parks, supra note, at 3 (footnotes omitted.)

37

See also, Art. 36:

If such works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments belonging to a hostile nation or
government, can be removed without injury, the ruler of the conquering state or nation may order
them to be seized and removed for the benefit of the said nation. The ultimate ownership is to be
settled by the ensuing treaty of peace.

In no case shall they be sold or given away, if captured by the armies…nor shall they ever be privately
appropriated, or wantonly destroyed or injured.

See also, Articles 14, 15, 16, 31, 34, 37, and 46 and Parks, supra note, at 3-5.
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Not long after the Lieber Code was drafted, the first multinational treaty for limiting the
conduct of war was concluded. The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field was the result of the efforts of Henri
Dunant. Dunant had observed the grave suffering of the wounded left on the battlefield
after the battle of Solferino, Italy in 1859. He formed an organization prepared to help
such victims in the future. It became the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). In 1864 states signed the first multinational treaty to protect the victims of
war—the sick and wounded on the battlefield. The Convention codified protections for
the wounded as well as allowing for Red Cross and other humanitarian personnel to assist
them.38
Czar Alexander II of Russia called another conference on protection of war victims and
restrictions on the conduct of war in 1874 in Brussels.39 (He had called an earlier
conference in 1868 to prohibit the exploding bullet. The result was the Declaration of St.
Petersburg in which the parties renounced the use of exploding projectiles weighing less
than 400 grams.) The British, the leading military power at the time of the Brussels
conference had little interest in a treaty restricting the conduct of war and succeeded in
blocking the adoption of a binding text. Nevertheless, the declaration produced by the
fifteen participating states provided important protections, including for cultural property:
The Property of parishes (communes), or establishments devoted to
religion, charity, education, arts and science, although belonging to the
State, shall be treated as private property.
Every seizure, destruction of, or willful damage to, such establishments,
historical monuments, or works of art or of science, should be prosecuted
by competent authorities.40
The Brussels Declaration also paved the way for another meeting in 1880 in Oxford,
England that resulted in the Manual of the Laws of War on Land.41 The Lieber Code, the
Declaration of St. Petersburg, and the Oxford Manual were all important precursors to the
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The Conferences were called to promote
peace and ameliorate war. To accomplish the first, a permanent arbitration facility was
created. For the second, various in bello rules were codified in agreements on the
38

THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note, at 18; GREEN, supra note, at 30

39

40

Cited in MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note, at 25.

41

GREEN, supra note, at 31-32.
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conduct of war, agreements that remain binding law today. The 1899 Conference
adopted various declarations prohibiting the use of certain weapons as an annex of
regulations on the conduct of land warfare. In 1907, the 1899 conventions were amended
and ten more conventions relating to the conduct of war were added.42 Hague
Convention (IV) of 1907 included a somewhat modified annex of regulations on land
warfare. These “Hague Regulations” are still a central part of the law of war, particularly
with respect to the protection of cultural property. Article 56 of the Hague Regulations
requires:
The Property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion,
charity and education, the arts and sciences even when State property,
shall be treated as private property.
All seizure or destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this
character, historic monuments, works of art and science is forbidden, and
should be made the subject of legal proceedings.
The Hague Regulations also require that the occupying power maintain law and order:43
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands
of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety [l’ordre et la
vie publics], while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country.
The Convention proper to which the Regulations are attached also contains an important
provision relevant to the topic of this paper: Article 3 states, “A Belligerent party which
violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of
its armed forces.”44
The Hague Peace Conferences did not prevent the First World War, nor apparently
significantly mitigate the suffering of the military or civilians. The parties to the conflict
did accept “Hague Law” as governing the conflict and some litigation occurring during
42

GREEN, supra note, at 31-32.

43

Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907 Hague Convention IV), Oct. 18,
1907, Annex, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter HR].

44

Id.at art. 3.
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and after the war relied on it. The Allies particularly wished to punish Germany for the
destruction of the University of Louvain in Belgium and the Cathedral of Rheims.
Article 246 of the Treaty of Versailles provided that: “Germany undertakes to furnish to
the University of Louvain, within three months after a request made by it and transmitted
through the intervention of the Reparation Commission, manuscripts, incunabula, printed
books, maps and objects of collection corresponding in number and value to those
destroyed in the burning by Germany of the Library of Louvain.”45
The Treaty of Versailles also launched a new effort to improve the law prohibiting resort
to war. It provided for the creation of a new organization with the responsibility to
maintain international peace and security: The League of Nations. The League was
organized under its Covenant of April 28, 1919. In addition to establishing the new
organization, the Covenant also required that states try arbitration before resort to force.
League members were committed to collective action against unlawful uses of force.46
Despite its central role in drafting the Versailles Treaty and the League Covenant, the
United States did not join the League. To try to demonstrate that it was nevertheless
committed to peace, the US promoted the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.47 The parties to
the Pact renounced war and committed themselves to seeking the peaceful settlement of
disputes.
Owing to the great suffering of civilians in the First World War, the International
Committee of the Red Cross began work on a convention aimed at protecting civilians in
time of war.48 The final draft of a civilians convention was approved at the 1934 Tokyo
International Conference of the Red Cross, but the Second World War broke out before
the Tokyo draft could be submitted to a diplomatic conference. In the Americas, a
specific agreement for the protection of cultural property was concluded in 1935, the
Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments,
or the Roerich Pact.49 Twenty-one states signed the Pact, although only eleven became
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parties. Still, the Pact introduced some innovations to cultural property protection that
became part of later agreements, such as a registry for listing cultural property to be
protected in wartime and an emblem to be placed on protected buildings.
Despite these various treaties and the existence of the League, German and Japanese
leaders, imbued with a sense of their moral and cultural superiority and of their destiny to
rule other peoples, initiated wars in stunning disregard of the prohibitions on the use of
force and the rules in place on the conduct of war. The Nazis systematically plundered or
destroyed cultural property wherever they went. In addition to the well-known theft of
cultural property from Jews and other Nazi victims, the Nazis destroyed 427 museums in
the Soviet Union.50 Following the war, around 200 high political, business, and military
leaders in Germany and the Far East were tried and punished for these law violations.
The League Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Hague Conventions, and the Geneva
Conventions (of 1929) were cited as law binding on the aggressors and forming a basis
for individual accountability.51 At Nuremberg, two leading Nazi officials, Hermann
Goering and Alfred Rosenberg, were charged specifically with plunder of cultural
property.52 The Allies, in turn, are criticized for the terror bombing of the treasure city of
Dresden, the unnecessary destruction of the ancient monastery of Monte Cassino, and
other acts inconsistent with the law of armed conflict. At the end of the war, the Soviets
plundered over a million objects from Germany, claiming them as reparations and
replacement for what they had lost.53
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The overwhelming need to prevent another such world war was the motivating factor in
creating the United Nations and its Charter. Since the adoption of the Charter in 1945,
international law has prohibited the use of force except in self-defense or with the
authorization of the UN Security Council.54 The right of self-defense is the right to use
armed force against an armed attacker when that force can prevent future attacks and is
proportional in the circumstances. Despite the many violations of these rules since 1945,
they have been reinforced on a regular basis and remain the binding law on the right to
resort to armed force.55
The vast and intentional destruction and looting of cultural property in the Second World
War was one motivating factor in the development of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions “provide protection for all those who, as a consequence of
an armed conflict, have fallen into the hands of the adversary. The protection envisaged
here is, hence, not protection against the violence of war itself, but against the arbitrary
power which one belligerent party acquires in the course of the war over persons
belonging to the other party.”56 Thus, Geneva law focuses most essentially on
combatants no longer fighting (hor de combat), civilians, and their property. However,
detailed protection of cultural property was provided for only in 1954 in the Hague
Convention mentioned above. The United States never became a party to the 1954
Convention out of concern that the Convention’s balance is weighted too heavily toward
protection and away from the rights of military necessity. Still, the US agrees that much
of the Convention is customary international law, including the key provision in Article
4(3): “The High Contracting Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if
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necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of
vandalism directed against, cultural property.” 57
In the 1970s, following the Biafran and Vietnam wars, the International Committee of the
Red Cross convened another major conference to update the 1949 conventions. Two
Protocols emerged from the conferences in 1977.58 Additional Protocol I is devoted to
international armed conflicts. Additional Protocol II is devoted to non-international
armed conflict where rebel forces have gained control of territory. Both Protocols
supplement the Geneva Conventions, filling some gaps and updating some provisions. In
certain cases, provisions based on the Hague Conventions are also included. Provisions
on the protection of cultural property are found in Additional Protocol I Article 53 and in
Additional Protocol II Article 16:
Article 53 Protection of Cultural Objects and of Places of Worship
Without Prejudice to the provisions of the [1954] Hague Convention…,
and of other relevant international instruments, it is prohibited:
(a) to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments,
works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples;
(b) to use such objects in support of the military effort;
(c) To make such objects the object of reprisals.

Article 16 Protection of Cultural Objects and Places of Worship
Without Prejudice to the Provisions of the [1954] Hague Convention…, it
is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against historic
monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural
or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the military
effort.
Additional Protocol I also makes certain kinds of destruction of cultural property a grave
breach of the Protocol in Article 85.59 Grave breaches are particularly serious violations
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of the law of the Conventions. States have a duty to suppress grave breaches, by, among
other measures, providing for penal sanctions and by searching for and prosecuting
persons accused of grave breaches—regardless of the accused’s nationality.60
The official commentary on Additional Protocol I says the obligation in Article 53 is
stricter than that of the Hague Convention, “since it does not provide for any derogation,
even ‘where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.’ As long as the object
concerned is not made into a military object by those in control….”61
The United States has signed but not ratified either Protocol. It has declared some
provisions generally binding as customary international law,62 including some of the
provisions protecting civilians and civilian objects. The United States does not believe,
however, that the prohibition on reprisals against civilian objects is part of customary
international law, including, apparently, reprisals against cultural property.63 The British
share this position with the United States and have made an elaborate reservation to

a.

4.

60
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Article 53, sub-paragraph (b), and … [the object is] not located in the immediate proximity of
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Additional Protocol I that will allow them to take reprisals against civilians in some
limited circumstances.64
The next major development in the protection of cultural property in time of war came
when the Security Council established courts in 1993 and 1994 to try international law
crimes from the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda.
The Statute for the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia gave authority to
prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and certain serious violations of the
laws or customs of war. In addition to listing extensive or wanton destruction of property
not justified by military necessity as a crime, the ICTY Statute also includes the “seizure
of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and
education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science” and
“plunder of public or private property.”65 The Rwanda Statute mentions only pillage.66
The two statutes helped pave the way for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. The Rome Statute specifically addresses destruction of cultural property in Article
8(2): “For purposes of this statute, ‘war crimes’ means:
(b)(x): Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not military objectives.67
In addition to these various treaties, customary international law rules have also emerged
with importance to cultural property protection have evolved. In addition to various
treaty rules now part of customary international, the general customary law principles of
necessity and proportionality govern all decisions on the use of force.68 Necessity refers
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to military necessity, and the obligation that force is used only if necessary to accomplish
a reasonable military objective.69 Proportionality prohibits that “which may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.”70 Military necessity and proportionality are both a sword and a
shield. While these principles protect cultural property when there is no necessity great
enough to warrant destruction, if such property is turned to a military purpose, the
protection is lifted. In 2003 and 2004, insurgents in Iraq turned mosques into military
objectives. Nevertheless, the United States generally refrained from attacking mosques.71
During the Gulf War, the United States decided that cultural monuments at the ancient
site of Ur were more precious than destroying Iraqi aircraft that Saddam Hussein had
ordered to be placed near them.72
These customary principles also influence the legality of a resort to force. In the
Nicaragua Case decided in 1986, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) said, “Even if
the Untied States activities in question had been carried on in strict compliance with the
canons of necessity and proportionality, they would not thereby become lawful. If
however, they were not, this may constitute an additional ground of wrongfulness.”73
Similarly, in 2003, the ICJ said the following regarding necessity and proportionality:
“‘whether the response to the [armed] attack is lawful depends on observance of the
criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence.’”74
Greenwood, too, argues that the legal basis on which force is initiated is linked to how a
conflict is conducted. If the basis for using force is the right of self-defense,
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[t]his right permits only the use of such force as is reasonably necessary
and proportionate to the danger. This requirement of proportionality, …
means that it is not enough for a state to show that its initial recourse to
force was a justifiable act of self-defense and that its subsequent acts have
complied with the ius in bello. It must also show that all its measures
involving the use of force, throughout the conflict, are reasonable,
proportionate acts of self-defence. Once its response ceases to be
reasonably proportionate then it is itself guilty of a violation of the ius ad
bellum.75
Saddam Hussein’s conduct of the Gulf War included vast disregard for the law of armed
conflict that even if he had had a basis for invading Kuwait,76 the way he did it would
have undermined the legality of the war. By contrast, the Coalition fighting to defend
Kuwait took the law of armed conflict seriously. One of the most important examples
was the decision not to occupy all of Iraq and change the regime in Baghdad. The
wisdom of this decision is contested in some circles today, but the legal limits on what
the Coalition could do restricted any greater use of force against Iraq than was necessary
to liberate Kuwait. When the Coalition liberated Kuwait, it provided for its future
security in the form of a buffer zone on the territory of Iraq.77 Similarly, in 2001, when
the United States and the United Kingdom acted in collective self-defense against
Afghanistan, Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that the US would not aim to
eliminate the ruling Taliban entirely.78 The US wanted to clear all Al Qaeda operations
from Afghanistan. It did not need to overthrow the Taliban for that purpose. Events
seemed to have overtaken the United States, however, when suddenly the Northern
Alliance–long engaged in a war for control of Afghanistan–continued on to Kabul and
completely routed the Taliban from power. The US apparently did not intend this
outcome and may not be responsible for the disproportionate effects of its decision to use
force in self-defense.79

75

Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUD.
221, 223 (1983).
76

See e.g., awards of the United Nations Compensation Commission, http://www.unog.ch/uncc (This is the
body charged with overseeing claims against Iraq arising from the Gulf War. Over $200 billion in claims
were made, most for acts that violating the law of armed conflict.)
77

Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N.’s Response to Iraq’s
Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453 (1991); but see DINSTEIN, supra note, at 211-12.

78

Pamela Constable, U.S. Hopes To Attract Moderates in Taliban; Powell Sees Them in ‘New
Afghanistan’, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2001, at A24.

79

Another proportionality issue did arise in Afghanistan, however, several governments, including,
Afghanistan’s own interim government, criticized the United States for continuing to bomb after the
Taliban fell in December 2001. See, discussion in Mary Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to
Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. R. 889 (2002).

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

In short, when a leader decides to resort to war, whether in self-defense or with Security
Council authorization,80 the decision must be consistent with the principles of necessity
and proportionality. Lawful armed force today is for the purpose of law enforcement. It
is force to counter a previous unlawful use of force or threat of unlawful force. Lawful
resort to force today can be compared to the force of the police countering the force of
the criminal. The exceptional uses of force that are lawful today must arguably be as
limited as possible.
Limiting the use of force that may be used provides the beneficial side effect of
protecting cultural property. The less force used, the less likely museums, protected
buildings, and other cultural monuments will be destroyed. The less force used, the less
likely that civil society will collapse and give way to looting and theft of cultural
property. Thus, by the eve of the US-led invasion of Iraq important treaties and rules of
customary international law combined to create an established and widely known norm of
cultural property protection in time of armed conflict.
III. Iraq and the Optimist’s Plan
The US-led invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003, cannot be justified on the basis of selfdefense or Security Council authorization. The Bush Administration and some scholars
have argued that Security Council’s resolutions from the Gulf War could provide the
authority to use force against Iraq in 2003. The argument hardly bears scrutiny.81 The
80
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Mark Danner confirms that the Administration had at least two other reasons besides the proffered
justication of enforcing UN Security Council resolution for using force in Iraq—reasons that could not be
justified in international law:
National Security: To remove Iraq as a threat to American dominance of the Person Gulf and to
Israel, and make it America’s central ally and base in the region, replacing as increasingly unstable
and Islamicist Saudi Arabia, from which American troops could be withdrawn.
Regional Transformation: To make Iraq an example of Arab democracy as the first step in ‘the
transformation of the Middle East’ which, in the words of national Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice, ‘is
the only guarantee that it will no longer produce ideologies of hatred that lead men to fly air planes into
buildings in New York and Washington.
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US lacked a legal basis for resorting to force in the first instance. In addition, the manner
in which the war was conducted forms an independent basis for arguing the decision to
use force against Iraq was unlawful. As discussed above, using more force than is
necessary or pursuing the wrong military objectives can render even a use of force in
self-defense unlawful. The argument here is that other failures to respect the jus in bello
can also render an otherwise lawful use of force unlawful. In the case of the US use of
force against Iraq, it must be asked whether invading the whole country and changing the
regime was proportional to the stated US goal of enforcing the Security Council’s Gulf
War resolutions, where overthrowing Saddam had not been contemplated. Even if it was
necessary and proportional to overthrow Saddam, the decision to invade and occupy the
country while intentionally disregarding the obligations of an occupying power amount to
ad bellum violations. The decision by United States military and political leaders to send
a force that had neither the orders to fulfill the in bello obligations, nor the practical
means to do so, undermined any legal basis the United States had to invade the country in
the first place.
We now know of several significant and intentional failures to mandate respect for the
law of armed conflict with regard to the occupation of Iraq. US Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld refused to listen to his military experts regarding the number and type
of troops needed to maintain order after the invasion. Secretary Rumsfeld ordered, at the
request of the C.I.A., that certain persons in military detention be hidden from the
ICRC.82 This order clearly violated provisions of the Geneva Conventions.83 Other
persons in US military detention have been tortured, abused, and subjected to inhuman
treatment. Military detention centers in Iraq have had too little food, medicine, and other
basic necessities for detainees.84 In part, the problems may be traced to the lack of
trained, professional Military Police and Military Intelligence personnel.
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These and other failures to fulfill the Hague and Geneva obligations of an occupying
power clearly undermine any legitimacy of the US invasion of Iraq. Likewise, US forces
were not ordered to protect the Iraqi National Museum and archeological sites from
looting both during the invasion and during the occupation, constituting another breach of
obligation.
One might ask whether failures to adequately prepare for war or failure to give the right
orders can amount to in bello violations. Certainly sending too few troops to fulfill the
obligations of an occupying power appears to be of the nature of an omission rather than
commission. Arguably a political or military commander making a good faith effort to
send the right number of troops or all the troops available might not violate the in bello
rules. That situation is almost the opposite of the one we saw in Iraq. It can hardly be in
good faith to ignore the advice of leading experts. Moreover, the failure of leadership to
ensure that military personnel follow the laws of war and the failure to issue orders that
fulfill the requirements of a lawful occupation can certainly be considered clear
violations.
US Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz had all advocated war with Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein
from power since the end of the Gulf War in 1991.85 These advocates of the war were
willing to believe information from Iraqi defectors that the war would be easy and low
cost, advise that contradicted the Pentagon’s own projections. This scenario made the
case for war more palatable for those, like President Bush, who were more hesitant.
Apparently, Secretary Rumsfeld based his decisions on the prediction that Iraq’s top
military leaders would overthrow Saddam Hussein and take over the country in a military
coup86 and that Iraqis would rally to the Americans, hailing them as liberators.
Theorectically, the US would not need to become an occupying power, instead turning
the nation over to a grateful and capable, soon-to-be-democratic Iraq.
So when the scenario did not materialize, the US and it coalition partners, Poland,
Australia, and Britain had insufficient troops and the wrong kind of troops to ensure
order, prevent looting, and protect lives. The US found enough troops to protect the Oil
Ministry, but not the Iraqi National Museum or other cultural heritage sites. Indeed, the
invading forces, by protecting the oil industry’s infrastructure did recognize and fulfill
part of their obligation to the Iraqi people. But that is perhaps offset by the failure to
protect libraries, museums, archeological digs, and other sites of significance to the local
population.
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Months before the invasion, the Bush Administration had been warned by a number of
organizations and experts that cultural sites would need protecting from bombing and
looting.87 Considerable looting had occurred after the 1991 Gulf War, so the likelihood
of it occurring again was known.
In January [2003], the Archaeological Institute of America issued a
statement calling on ‘all governments’ to protect cultural sites both during
and after a war. A mix of scholars, museum representatives, collectors
and dealers made the same case during a briefing at the Department of
Defense. ‘I did a lot of the talking,’ said McGuire Gibson, an Iraq
specialist at the University of Chicago’s Oriental Institute. ‘They had a list
of 150 sites, and I said there were many more than that, and that the
biggest problem was the aftermath.’88
The United States Army War College issued a study dated February 2003 describing
post-conflict requirements in Iraq. The authors state: “While it would be best to let the
Iraqis control access to historic and cultural sites, an occupying power assumes
responsibility for security of such places. Particular attention must be paid to religious
and historic sites that have great importance; their damage or destruction could fan
discontent or inspire violence, not just in Iraq but around the region.”89 Army Chief of
Staff General Eric Shinseki testifying before Congress also in February 2003 about the
size of force needed to invade Iraq said the following:
Something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers…We’re
talking about post hostilities control over a piece of geography that’s fairly
significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other
problems. And so it takes a significant ground-force presence to maintain
a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water is
distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering
a situations like this.90
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General Shinseki knew what the obligations would be in Iraq. The scenarios prepared in
advance of the invasion called for as many as 250,000 troops.91 The invading force that
was sent numbered about 170,000. About 130,000 troops remained for the occupation.
Former Secretary of the Army Thomas White explained why the decision was made to
send an inadequate force: “all of us thought a big force is going to be required for quite
some time…That’s what Shinseki said. That’s what I said. It’s been Don Rumsfeld’s
view that the military asks for too much force.” Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld’s deputy, said
in response to General Shinseki, that his estimate was ‘“wildly off the mark,” and a figure
of 100,000 was closer to the Pentagon’s expectations.”92
Rumsfeld refused to listen to the experts who said a large force would be needed. But he
also refused to take seriously the legal obligations that required a larger force. According
to the San Diego Union Tribune: “Though Pentagon officials were warned as early as
January 2003, and repeatedly since, that a US invasion would place cultural treasure in
grave danger, and though international law mandates the protection of artistic treasures in
time so of war, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made the point again and again that
soldiers were not there to stop plunder.”93 US and British troops said there were too few
of them to restore order.94
One author provides the following account of events at the Iraqi National Museum:
The commander of a tank battalion from the Army’s Third Infantry
Division told Reuters that his troops encountered ‘stiff resistance’ from the
museum, including small arms fire and a rocket-propelled grenade. The
tank battalion took casualties, and since the museum was ‘defended’ by
Iraqis, it lost its protected status. Apparently that loss became permanent
because after the actual fighting the tanks and armed soldiers stood by and
watched the looting.
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It was in connection with the looting and plunder that Secretary Rumsfeld made his now
famous comment, “Freedom’s untidy. And free people are free to make mistakes and
commit crimes and do bad things.”95
The Hague Regulations, however, state unequivocally that people are not free to commit
crimes. It is the duty of the occupying power to stop them. Nor may the occupying
power claim excuses such as military necessity for failing to protect cultural property
from looting and theft during an occupation.96 The failure to give the proper orders
appears to be related to the desire to keep costs low—protecting cultural property or
thousands of detainees would require thousands more troops. The failure to give the
proper orders is even more directly related to a general contempt for international law on
the part of the same US officials advocating for war. Secretary Rumsfeld has made clear
time and again that he does not recognize international law as applying to the United
States. In Seymour Hersh’s second article in The New Yorker on the prisoner abuse
scandal in Iraq, he wrote: “No amount of apologetic testimony or political spin last week
could mask the fact that, since the attacks of September 11th, President Bush and his top
aides have seen themselves as engaged in a war against terrorism in which the old rules
did not apply.”97 President Bush’s lawyer, White House Counsel Judge Alberto
Gonzalez has referred to the Geneva Conventions as outmoded and “quaint.”98
As a result of invade on the cheap and dismissing legal obligations, the United States had
neither a large enough force nor obviously a force with the right orders to fulfill its Hague
Regulation, 1954 Hague Convention, or Geneva Convention duties.
US officials dismissed the outcry over the Iraqi National Museum because the director
misstated the number of objects lost. He gave numbers as high as 170,000. The US State
Department now estimates it was 13,400. Worse in many ways was the total lack of
security around archeological sites:
The extent of illicit excavation in Iraq today is unprecedented. Iraqi
archaeologists and the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] ministry of
culture report that in the last 10 months [April 2003-February 2004] the
destruction at archaeological sites has reached a previously unimagined
level…Without the guards at ancient sites and police at border points in
the country, Iraqi cultural heritage will continue to be plundered.99
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In June 2003, a US Army Judge Advocate, just returned from Iraq, related that he had emailed the Pentagon starting in the fall of 2002 for the plan for post-hostilities operations.
He was told then it was too soon to get it. He e-mailed in January and was told it was too
soon. In February he was told he would get it–they were working on it. In March he
started e-mailing weekly. After the invasion began, he e-mailed daily. He was assured
he would get the plan before the Division reached Baghdad. When he reached Baghdad,
he e-mailed, “We are here.” As of June, he had not received a plan. He was angry
enough to share this information at a conference on international military law, despite the
risk to his career in openly criticizing the Administration.100
Retired general Wesley Clark, has written, “[I]n September 2002, I was disappointed to
learn that only a few discussions of postwar planning for Iraq had taken place. ‘Not a
popular subject on the third floor [where Defense Department policy is decided by
civilian leaders],’ I was informed. When planning finally began that autumn, it was
based on the assumption that a US invasion would be welcomed as a liberation by most
Iraqis.”101 According to Anthony Cordesman, “The same strategy designed to deliver a
carefully focused attack on the regime did not provide enough manpower to
simultaneously occupy and secure the areas that the Coalition liberated…and deal with
the wide range of local, regional, ethnic and religious divisions [the Coalition]
encountered.”102
The lack of adequate pre-war planning left the US with a force that, at the end of major
fighting:
was incapable of providing security, stopping the looting and sabotage,
and establishing a credible presence throughout the country—even within
Baghdad. The ensuing disorder vitiated some of the boost in US
credibility that was won on the battlefield, and it opened the way for
deeper and more organized resistance during the following weeks.103
Mark Danner, James Fallows, and other journalists have confirmed that planning for the
occupation was taken away from the State Department and handed to the Pentagon.104
Months of planning was discarded and instead the Pentagon’s optimists relied on the
views of Iraqi expatriates who told them what they wanted to hear:
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…Pentagon officials… hastily constructed a plan based largely on
optimistic assumptions about the warmth of the Iraqis’ attitude toward the
Americans, and about the ease with which new leaders could be imposed
on the existing governing institutions. Many of these expectations, which
were encouraged by favored Iraqi expatriates, dovetailed perfectly with
the Pentagon’s own reluctance to provide sufficient military police and
dirty its hands with other distasteful ‘nation-building’ tasks. When their
assumptions proved unfounded, administration officials were
excruciatingly slow to admit reality and make adjustments. These first
weeks of the occupation, in which security in Baghdad collapsed, chaos
ruled the streets, and the fledgling occupation authority daily issued
conflicting statements and made promises it did not keep, were a fiasco.105
According to Seymour Hersh, again, “[s]ecrecy and wishful thinking…are the defining
characteristics of Rumsfeld’s Pentagon….”106 It had been a hard sell since 1998 for
Rumsfeld and other proponents of war in Iraq to finally get the President’s approval.
Making a realistic estimate of the cost of the war in lives, dollars, and prestige may have
dissuaded the President. After all, despite all the efforts to come up with a persuasive
case that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, on the eve of the war, the
President had very little evidence in hand. He had no evidence of a link between Saddam
and Al Qaeda.107 Without a persuasive case for war, the cost, at least, would need to be
acceptable.

II.

Consequences

What consequences may flow from these violations of the law of armed conflict? There
is only a small chance of individual accountability by US leaders. By contrast, high
intangible costs have already been paid. Between these categories, there is a moderate
possibility that the United States and its coalition partners may one day pay actual
damages or provide in-kind reparations for failing to protect Iraqi cultural property.
With respect to individual accountability, we do have increasing numbers of cases where
individuals have been held responsible for violating the law of armed conflict. This law
is structured so that the individual’s state of nationality will, in the first instance hold him
or her responsible. Where this does not happen, increasingly other countries and
international courts are enforcing the law. For example, the Serbian leader Slobodan
Milosevic and other top Serb military and political officials have been charged with
violating the laws and customs of war by the prosecutor for the International Criminal
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Tribunal for Yugoslavia.108 The United States is not subject to the jurisdiction of any
international criminal court, so this avenue is unlikely for American leaders. A number
of national courts, however, have exercised jurisdiction over non-nationals who have
committed war crimes, at least where there is a link to the jurisdiction such as residence.
In D.P.P. v. T., the defendant, identified in the press as Refic Saric,109 was a Croatian
national living in Denmark under a temporary visa for persons from the territory of the
former Yugoslavia.110 He was tried and sentenced to eight years in a Danish prison “for
assault of a particularly cruel, brutal or dangerous nature and of such a malicious
character and with such grave consequences as to constitute particularly aggravating
circumstances...on 5 August 1993 in the Croatian POW camp of Dretelj in Bosnia...”111
Saric’s crimes occurred in Bosnia. No Danish citizens appeared to be among the victims.
Nevertheless, since Saric was in Denmark, Danish courts took jurisdiction under a law
implementing the Geneva Conventions in Danish criminal law.112
Any violation of the laws or customs of war is a war crime. Certain actions of US
officials with respect to Iraq may even amount to grave breaches, such as the failure to
protect detainees from abuse and torture. The failure to protect cultural property is a war
crime but probably not a grave breach. Still, top political and military officials are
responsible for the war crimes they order and the ones carried out by their subordinates.
According to L.C. Green:
Every individual, regardless of rank or governmental status, is personally
liable for any war crime or grave breach that he might commit.
A commander, that is to say, anyone in a position of command whatever
his rank might be, including a Head of State or the lowest non108
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commissioned officer, who issues an order to commit a war crime or a
grave breach is equally guilty of the offence with the subordinate actually
committing it. He is also liable if, knowing or having information from
which he should have concluded that a subordinate was going to commit
such a crime, he failed to prevent it, and if being aware of such
commission, fails to initiate disciplinary or penal actions.
Any commander failing to exercise proper control over his forces with the
result that they commit crimes, even if he remains unaware of this when
he should have known, is also liable for war crimes. This is because a
commander is responsible for the behaviour of this troops and ensuring
that they behave in accordance with the law of armed conflict.113
United States officials are most unlikely to take up residence in a jurisdiction that allows
for enforcement of the law of war as Denmark does. The United States and its coalition
partners, however, have already faced serious negative consequences for their actions and
inaction in Iraq. They have not faced the classic consequence—payment of simple
damages. They have, however, paid indirectly through the need to commit resources to
helping find Iraqi antiquities and restore cultural heritage sites. The United States has
established a process for the return of objects and has recovered a number of the most
important, including the Vase of Wraka.114 They have paid more substantially through
the loss of financial and other support from states that normally would assist them. They
have also paid in the form of diminished legitimacy in governing Iraq and lost standing in
the world.
Unlike the Gulf War of 1990-1991 where the United States received billions of dollars in
donations,115 or the major contributions of money, troops, and expertise provided during
the Afghan war, allies have provided far less assistance in the invasion and occupation of
Iraq.. The coalition is also paying for its failure to plan:
The weeks of looting and disorder that followed not only continued the
destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure, preventing the Americans from
supplying the country with electricity and other basic services. More
important, the looting and mayhem destroyed American political authority
113

GREEN supra note, at 303 (footnotes omitted.)

114

See United States State Department website tracking missing Iraqi cultural property:

http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/irmissing.html

115

Paying the Costs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1991, at A10.

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

even before it could be established; such political authority is rooted in the
monopoly of legitimate violence, which the Americans after standing by
during weeks of chaos and insecurity, were never able to attain.116
Another, more tangible consequence may yet materialize for the coalition with respect to
cultural property. International law generally requires that a state using force unlawfully
should pay reparations for damage caused by failing to comply with the jus in bello.117
Iraq has already paid $18 billion and is still paying to Kuwait and others for its unlawful
invasion in 1990.118 The same rule requires the US, UK, and other members of the
coalition to pay for the damage caused in Iraq by an unlawful invasion and occupation.
The United States has, however, never paid reparations for unlawful uses of force. We
can have no expectation that it will do so willingly this time. We can expect some
attempts to use judicial systems around the world to enforce the international law on the
use of force against the United States and its coalition partners. The German Federal
Prosecutor was pressed to initiate criminal proceedings against members of the German
116
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government for indirectly assisting the United States in invading Iraq.119 Other direct and
indirect attempts to bring legal actions for US violations respecting Iraq are bound to
occur, despite the fact similar attempts have always failed in the past.
With respect to cultural property, however, the invading states may face a far more
tangible consequence—future claims of in-kind reparations. The four nations of the
invading force may face future claims to return publicly held Iraqi antiquities. The
existence of such an obligation takes us squarely into the debate that has raged since Lord
Elgin stripped the Parthenon of its extraordinary marble artwork: “Internationalists” or
“retentionists” oppose the proponents of “cultural nationalism” with respect to the
obligation to return cultural property to the place of origin. The retentionists are losing
this battle.
In 1979, Amadou-Mahatar M’bow, Director-General of UNESCO called on states to
return cultural heritage using the following powerful argument:
…I call on historians and educators to help others to understand the
affliction a nation can suffer at the spoliation of the works it has created.
The power of the fait accompli is a survival of barbaric times and a source
of resentment and discord which prejudices the establishment of lasting
peace and harmony between nations….
Two thousand years ago, the Greek historian Polybius urged us to refrain
from turning other nations’ misfortunes into embellishments for our own
countries. Today when all peoples are acknowledged to be equal in
dignity, I am convinced that international solidarity can, on the contrary,
contribute practically to the happiness of mankind.
The return of a work of art or record to the country which created it
enables a people to recover part of its identity, and proves that the long
119
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dialogue between civilizations which shapes the history of the world is
still continuing in an atmosphere of mutual respect between nations.120
Merryman, perhaps the leading advocate of internationalism, has urged in response that
“cultural nationalism is a form of nationalism and for that reason is subject to all the
usual concerns: the tendency to become invidious, to breed rivalry, misunderstanding and
conflict, and to divide rather than unite. The 1954 Hague Convention spoke of ‘the
cultural heritage of mankind’ in a spirit of internationalism.”121 Yet, even Merryman
concludes that the “right of return” is today the more dominant principle: “The repeated
assumption, or assertion, of the premise that cultural objects belong in their nations of
origin gives it a growing momentum. As consensus grows, law may not be far
behind.”122 Merryman quotes the International Council of Museums for the view that the
“‘community of nations now considers as an element of jus cogens the right of all people
to recover property which forms an integral part of their cultural identity.’”123
In a subtle but important way the recent payment of reparations for crimes of the Second
World War also supports return. The current ethos in the United States is toward
pressing liability and righting wrongs—at least against foreign countries. The ethos
opposes settlement and forgiveness. This ethos is sympathetic to the Russian argument
that they may keep objects looted from Germany to substitute for objects looted or
destroyed by the Nazis.124 The Russians argue the Germans can never afford to repay
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them in money—though, of course they should try–but at any rate some things are
irreplaceable.125 The Russians point to the Versailles Treaty and the demand that
Germany substitute books from its own collections for the books destroyed at the
University of Louvain.126 After the Second World War, some agreements for
substitutions in kind were also made.127 This ethos supports return to Iraq even of
objects acquired decades ago and purchased or acquired lawfully. When the norm of war
reparations is married to the norm of cultural nationalism, the argument for return of Iraqi
cultural heritage is compelling.128

V.

Conclusion

When the leaders of the United States, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Australia
considered going to war in Iraq, their decision should have rested on the answers to three
preliminary questions: was there a legal right to use force; did it make sense to use force
in the circumstances, and could they use force in a way that would not cost a
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disproportionate number of lives and destruction of property? The answer to the final
question might have been yes but only if the US and its partners were willing to devote
the resources needed to carry out the invasion in a lawful manner. In other words, to
have the right to fight the war, they had to be willing to fight it right. Their unwillingness
to ensure that the invasion and occupation were conducted in accordance with
international law added an additional basis on which to conclude that the US-led invasion
of Iraq, begun March 19, 2003, was wholly unlawful under the most fundamental
principles of international law.
The invasion was a violation of our legal heritage as to why and how to fight—a legal
heritage forged in wars not so long past. Iraqi cultural heritage continues to be looted
with ease.129 The US and its allies face two obligations: to stop the plunder of Iraqi
cultural heritage and to make restitution for the property they made no effort to protect.
That restitution best takes the form of Iraqi objects of cultural significance currently held
in the US and in its partner nations in the invasion of Iraq.
Those who watched the crisis over Iraqi cultural heritage could not have been completely
surprised by other failures of the occupying powers, in particular, the abuse of persons in
US military detention. This failure, too, resulted from dismissing the legal obligations of
occupation in the rush to war.
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